Abstract: CCS (carbon dioxide capture and storage) is an issue which has received increasing attention in the debate on climate change over the last several years because of its relative technical simplicity and very large potential in reducing carbon dioxide emissions. The absence of secondary benefits and uncertainties associated with this approach, however, would require analysts to conduct fine costbenefit comparisons vis-à-vis other mitigation options. The paper is to provide a perspective on future cost-benefit discussions of CCS by highlighting the optimality of CCS use viewed as a non-renewable resource with a limited capacity. Scarcity of CCS (storage) capacity should involve a shadow price which could raise CCS's effective price -this is a fair assumption given the technological assessments of CCS so far, but no economic study has explicitly investigated this characteristic before. By using a simple analytical dynamic optimization model, we examine the optimal paths of CCS use, CCS's real price inclusive of the shadow price, and their difference from the operational price. A particular implication of the model is that if all else is equal, the shadow price of CCS could make the technology relatively less attractive than renewable energy due to CCS's reliance on scarce reservoirs and the resultant shadow value. This serves as a justification for giving differentiated incentives to different CO 2 reduction options: more precisely, more encouragement should be given to renewable energy in comparison to CCS. 
Introduction
CCS (carbon dioxide capture and storage 1 ) is an item that has increased its recognition over the past several years in the multi-faceted debates on climate change. This emergence is to a large extent a reflection of the policy environment, facing conflicting needs for stringent longterm control of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) emissions and for devising politically feasible policy paths given the current economy's reliance on fossil fuel. CCS is a set of techniques for separating and capturing CO 2 from emission sources (e.g., coal power plants), transporting and storing it in secure locations (e.g., underground saline aquifers, which are not usable for drinking water or irrigation) semi-permanently in order to reduce atmospheric CO 2 emissions (for a technical review of CCS, see IPCC, 2005) . Although CCS is still in a development stage with only a handful of active demonstration projects across the world, the concept is technically straightforward given the wealth of fossil fuel extraction or mining technologies already accumulated, and its potential is thought to be extremely large -according to IPCC (2005) , CCS could sequester at least 2,000 gigatons (Gt) of CO 2 , 2 the amount comparable with the total global CO 2 emissions for several decades at the current annual level of emissions.
In parallel with the growing recognition of CCS in the policy field, some seminal academic studies have been issued over the last several years in terms of the potential role of CCS in future climate policy ( [16] , [12] , [8] , [23] , [14] ). While they devote a substantial amount of their discussion to possible near-future application of CCS in limited circumstances (e.g., coal
power generation), they all foresee immense long-term implications for CCS: in other words, CCS is not assumed to be a niche technology that could be deployed only in a small scale, but a major component of future carbon reduction portfolio that could be utilized extensively, possibly to the extent of several gigatons annually worldwide. 3 With this potential significance of CCS, however, it is also likely that CCS is not going to become a technology which could supersede all the other CO 2 mitigation options, as the technology provides little secondary benefits besides CO 2 reduction in most forms of potential application. In addition, some skeptics question the viability of this entire approach by pointing out a variety of possible weaknesses, ranging from high costs 4 to environmental risks.
In this sense, CCS is not a method which will automatically solve the dilemma with regard to carbon dioxide emissions and climate change. In other words, the importance of CCS can be only judged in a relative way, in presence of a range of other mitigation options and carbon policy schemes.
This paper is to give a perspective for future cost-benefit discussions on CCS, an issue which inherently needs fine comparisons with other options for effective policy making as suggested above. The central idea in the subsequent discussion is that CCS opportunities can be treated as a non-renewable resource and should involve a scarcity rent, and therefore that cost-benefit considerations about CCS in the carbon management portfolio should be made by taking account of the real price of CCS, inclusive of the shadow price. It might sound peculiar to talk 3 In fact, CCS's application could be potentially extended to the entire fossil fuel sectors by making use of additional technologies such as coal liquification or direct CO 2 collection from the air. For discussion, see [12] . 4 CCS could in fact dramatically increase the cost of power generation. The IPCC [8] estimated that usage CCS would lead to increase in power generation costs by 40-85% (2-3 cents per kWh) for conventional coal (pulverized coal) power plants and by 20-55% (1-2 cents per kWh) for new-type IGCC plants. Also, the real cost of carbon reduction through CCS would be even higher than these numbers as the efficiency of CO 2 capture for those plants is not 100% (about 80-90%) and also some CO 2 is emitted during the process of CCS itself (i.e., how much CO 2 is captured and how much CO 2 is avoided are different questions). It should be noted, however, that the cost of CCS should be matched with the social cost of CO 2 emissions, not the cost of power generation.
about the scarcity of CCS opportunities, as CCS is estimated to have a gigantic potential.
However, one should be also reminded that CCS is expected to be used in a gigantic scale.
Moreover, CCS's total capacity is probably significantly smaller than the resource size of fossil fuel, with which CCS would be used: the IPCC's figure mentioned above, 2,000 GtCO 2 (545 Gt of carbon (GtC)), is about one tenth of the estimated total resource size of fossil fuel (5,000-6,000 GtC: see for example [19] ).
To address the above aspect, the paper examines the economic optimality of CCS use with a simple resource-economic analytical model. While there has already been a fairly ample accumulation of economic studies on CCS, the economic optimality of CCS has not been clearly discussed in the debate, as CCS has been considered only as an item to fill the accounting gap between future projections of carbon emissions and some stabilization target.
Meanwhile, intertemporal characteristics of cost determinants have been investigated for the case of forest carbon sequestration (e.g., [1] , [17] , [22] , [15] , [21] ). For example, Sohngen and
Mendelsohn [21] discussed a simple analytical optimal control model similar to this model.
They considered intertemporal cost minimization of climate damage and mitigation. They showed that the marginal costs of tree planting, lengthening of rotations, and forest management improvement should be equal to the marginal cost of other forms of climate change mitigation. However, all of these works do not analyze in depth the shadow values associated to forest carbon sequestration due to the fact that the effect of forest carbon sequestration is impermanent. To the author's knowledge, this study is the first analysis which explicitly considered the scarcity rent of CCS or of carbon sequestration in general.
The Basic Model
Here, we describe a simple resource-economic model about CCS 5 and energy use. The scope of the model is to find an optimal path of CCS use in presence of the necessity of carbon dioxide control and alternative technology to reduce emissions. The key idea behind the model is to treat CCS as a non-renewable resource with a limited capacity (i.e., once CCS geological reservoirs are filled up with CO 2 , one cannot sequester CO 2 with those reservoirs anymore).
The model uses the approach of dynamic optimization, which is a well-established method for resource-economic modeling. 6 In the model, the single-sector economy gains welfare from fossil fuel consumption. With this setting, the decision-maker faces a choice: whether to limit fuel use, or to use CCS, or to go for alternative energy. He or she makes decisions based on the costs of each option. It should be noted that these costs are the total social costs, not pure operational ones 7 : since today's CCS use indirectly affects CCS's unit operational cost in the future (since cheaper reservoirs are exploited first), CCS use entails shadow prices, which could push up the social costs. This factor could substantially influence dynamic characters of CCS's rate of use and price.
In the model, the economy uses fossil fuel to increase its welfare while keeping carbon dioxide emissions in control with CCS to avoid economic effects of climate change. In this 5 It should be noted that "CCS" referred here signifies a set of processes involving underground CO 2 storage (which already has some commercial-scale demonstrations), and that it excludes theoretically more abundant yet less proven options such as mineral carbonization. In the framework of this model, these alternative CCS methods (which are likely to be more expensive than the underground injection approach) could be interpreted as elements among the "alternative" mitigation portfolio (which eventually work as a backstop). 6 For general discussions of this approach in the resource-economic context, see [3] . 7 As we will see, depending on economic structure, the social costs of CCS could be equal to the private costs. However, the social costs are at least different from the operational costs of CCS.
world, CCS does not cause any environmental harm, and its permanence of storage is certified.
The following is major assumptions of the model:
(i) There are two ways to reduce CO 2 emissions: CCS and the use of alternative energy.
(ii) CCS opportunities are limited (carbon storage capacity is a scarce resource).
(iii) The marginal cost of CCS use is constant.
(iv) Emissions without CCS are allowed up to a certain cumulative target.
In the model, two methods can be used to reduce CO 2 emissions: CCS and the bundle of alternative energies which has an aggregate cost function with the standard convex shape (the assumption (i)). Meanwhile, there is limitation in the total amount of CCS use, thus optimization must take account of this scarcity (the assumption (ii)). The third condition (iii)
is to say the practice of CCS is uniform in all cases and can be conducted at the same marginal cost (later, we discuss an alternative case relaxing this assumption). The fourth assumption (iv) comes from the idea that CO 2 concentrations should be stabilized below a certain level, assuming that modest CO 2 increases below the target do not cause significant welfare impact (damage). This is in accordance with some of the actual policy targets such as EU's long-term climate target to keep the increase of global average temperature below 2 ˚C.
This accumulative emission target could be incorporated by treating it as another "nonrenewable resource": we could define some total emission target R T0 , which is a cumulative limit of carbon emission under which some emission f T is allowed per unit of time. Later, we consider a more general case where uncontrolled emissions incur disutility through climate change.
Mathematically, the intertemporal optimization of CCS use with the above assumptions is expressed as the following welfare maximization problem: 
W(f+a):
Welfare from energy use (W(0)>0, W′>0 and W′′<0)
Cost of fossil fuel *We assume a constant marginal cost, thus
Cost of CCS operation *We assume a constant marginal cost, thus C
The cost function of alternative energy use has a convex shape. We assume since some forms of alternative energy could be introduced virtually at no marginal cost in a small scale (e.g., riding a bicycle instead of a car (use of physical energy in place of fossil energy)).
The maximization problem could be solved with the following Hamiltonian with constraints.
where p x and p fT are the shadow prices of CCS use and allowable (uncontrolled) emissions, respectively.
By replacing f with x+f T , the Lagrangian for the above problem is expressed as follows:
where λ 1 and λ 2 are Lagrangian multipliers. 9 As explained in the text, a could be exploited at infinitesimal cost in the vicinity of 0 and therefore always satisfies a ≥ 0 in this model setting. Also,
The following is the necessary conditions for solutions with regard to the Lagrangian multipliers:
The following four cases are possible for solutions.
Case A (λ 1 = 0 and λ 2 > 0): All emissions are controlled with CCS In this case, f=x and f T =0, and from (3),
Also, the following two conditions are obtained from the Hamiltonian.
( ) The interpretations of these conditions are as follows. First, the condition (7) ). The shadow price increases at the rate of discount rate (δ).
The condition (5) says that the marginal welfare of energy use (i.e., the total use of both fossil fuel and alternative energy) equals the marginal costs of fossil fuel and CCS plus the shadow price. The right-hand side of the condition deals with the total costs of fossil fuel use and CCS as a package.
The condition (6) means that the marginal welfare of energy use equals the marginal cost of alternative energy use, which should be equal to the right-hand side in the condition (5) as well.
Case B (λ 1 > 0 and λ 2 = 0): All emissions are uncontrolled
In this case, x=0 and f T =f, and from (4),
The condition (6) also holds in this case. (6) In addition, the Hamiltonian gives the following condition. 11 See [6] . In this case, f=x=f T =0, and only the condition (6) holds: (6) This is the case in which fossil fuel use is totally replaced by alternative energy.
The discussion of Case C implies that due to the inherently higher cost of CCS relative to uncontrolled emissions, CO 2 are first emitted without control up to the cumulative target before CCS kicks in. After CCS is introduced, its real price (inclusive of the shadow price) rises over time, and eventually the CCS resource is depleted. Finally, the alternative energy takes all the energy supply. In other words, the system experiences the following transition:
Case B Case A Case D. Figure 2 shows the dynamics of the system. The times T 1 and T 2 correspond to the points at which the switch between the types of energy use (uncontrolled emissions CCS full renewable) takes place. 
Discussion: More reflections on the shadow price of CCS
In the above basic model in which the marginal cost of CCS is constant until reaching an absolute limit of storage capacity, the use of CCS involves a Hotelling-type increasing shadow price due to scarcity of storage reservoirs. The real price of CCS is higher than the marginal cost of CCS operation, and this discrepancy widens over time. Accordingly, the optimal level of CCS use decreases over time. 12 Interestingly, this conclusion of decreasing CCS use over time is in contrast to Pacala and Socolow's "wedges" proposal, in which they presupposed that CO 2 reduction is scaled up over time [16] . The two analyses (the current model and Pacala and Socolow's study) are based on very different assumptions from different viewpoints, but the contrast in the results is noteworthy. One important reason for the difference between the two sets of results is that the present model captures the effect that mitigation effort drives up the effective price of energy and thus suppresses energy consumption, while this factor is ignored in the wedges argument; Pacala and Socolow conservatively estimated that carbon reduction exclusively comes from choices of technologies, not from the fact that an energy cost increase by mitigation would reduce energy use. Meanwhile, another factor for the discrepancy between the two analyses is the assumptions about energy use trends: while fossil energy use follows a decreasing trend (the optimal pattern) in the present model, carbon emissions (essentially the same as fossil energy demand) increases over time due to pressure of economic growth in Pacala and Socolow's assumption. This increasing energy demand is in essence a result of income effects, which the current model does not account for: as the world population grows richer, people want more energy (and importantly, in Pacala and Socolow's assumption, income effects outweigh substitution effects: with higher income, they do not switch consumption from fossil energy to other goods significantly). Asia means that much of CCS can be carried out domestically within the regions. In other words, CCS is less prone to be subjected to OPEC-like price manipulation than oil. Also, historical patterns of CO 2 emissions suggest that the "demand" for carbon emissions might be steadier than that of most commodities. In this sense, although there is a chance that an increasing number of inexpensive reservoirs are going to be discovered in the future, it is possible to at least expect that CCS is less likely to face severe price volatility such as oil's, which can eclipse the effect of scarcity rent.
Meanwhile, the possibility that companies could internalize CCS's shadow price is more ambiguous. On the one hand, the social costs of CCS could perfectly be woven into the market mechanism (or more precisely, into a quasi-market mechanism with some public incentives for carbon dioxide reduction) if property rights are appropriately assigned. For example, if the shadow price takes the form of a Hotelling rent, standard theory tells us that competitive companies could internalize it in their pricing as they rationally estimate current
and future values of their resource. However, in practice, the shadow price could be taken as an externality as well since the capacity of carbon sequestration is after all an "artificial" resource i.e., it is valuable as long as there exist policy incentives for carbon dioxide reduction, and companies may not expect permanency of CCS's resource values in presence of unpredictability on policy or development of alternative technologies. If it were the case, private decisions would not produce the optimal pattern of use, and some corrective policy for CCS pricing would be favorable.
Another consideration in discussing the shadow price of CCS is the cost structure of CCS operation. The marginal cost of CCS operation may not be constant, and the price path may not take the standard Hotelling pattern. Even though the cost structure could be different, however, a shadow price should still exist as we will see in the following example. One possible case of alternative cost structure is that the marginal cost of CCS use rises according to the accumulated amount of use since less expensive reservoirs would be exploited first. The operating costs of CCS may depend on reservoir types of CO 2 storage (e.g., the depth of the reservoir, the distance between the site and industrial centers), but in principle the costs should be independent of the rate of CCS use itself if the market can adjust its scale of CCS operation swiftly.
While the shift of operation from cheaper to more expensive reservoirs could raise the marginal cost of CCS operation over time, there are also some potential mechanisms that could facilitate an initial decrease of the resource cost, such as efforts of resource exploration and technological change ( [18] , [20] , [4] ; a review on this matter is given by [11] ). ( ) ( ) ( ) Meanwhile, the cost of alternative energy could also decline over time due to technological improvement in response to a growing scale of installation. 14 Indeed, in reality, many energy technologies have experienced a price decline in parallel with cumulative electricity production. 15 In the presence of technologically-driven cost reduction of alternative energy, some contrast could arise between CCS and alternative energy with regard to long-term cost trends: the cost of CCS rises with exploitation in the long run, while that of alternative energy decreases by the learning-by-doing effect (which is an externality) as the technique is widely adopted. 16 For this case, the Hamiltonian for the maximization problem is rewritten as follows:
where G is the accumulated amount of use in a (i.e., ). As G is increased, the cost level 14 See [9] and [10] for review of general issues existing in the relationship between technological change and environmental policy. 15 See for example, Experience Curves for Energy Technology Policy, IEA, 2000, p21. 16 In terms of advancement of environmental technologies, some stress the role of induced technological change in addition to the learning-by-doing effect. Induced technological change comes from innovations as a result of research investment that is conducted in response to environmental regulation. See for example, [5] . 17 The sign of the shadow price is reversed from that of p x and p fT just to imply that G increases with accumulative use of a as opposed to the case of Z or R T . However there is no fundamental conceptual difference between p a and the other two shadow prices. except that in the current case, alternative energy is more favored due to the negative shadow price.
In fact, one could notice that the sign of shadow price is opposite for CCS (in the long run) and for alternative energy as c(Z)≥0 and C a G ≤0. As seen in Figure 5 , in the optimal case, the shadow price for alternative energy drives its use higher, while that for CCS use is a decreasing factor of the use in the long run. It should be noted that the increase of alternative energy use due to its shadow price has an indirect effect on the shadow price level for CCS as well since the enhancement of alternative energy use decreases CCS use. ). This is a reducing factor for the amount of CCS use (x) relative to the case without technological change of alternative energy.
Endogeneity of the shadow prices for CCS and alternative energy could complicate the value assessment of both options, and it is possible that CCS's shadow value becomes an externality due to inadequate property rights assignment. If the shadow prices for both CCS and alternative energy are in fact externalities, the social planner should introduce an incentive differential between CCS and alternative energy corresponding to the price difference by p a +p x in order to obtain the optimal outcome.
In sum, the model favors a somewhat conservative policy with regard to CCS use, i.e., to limit its use relative to others, while it certainly shows one should use some CCS even in presence of fossil fuel scarcity and improving alternative technologies (on the condition that it is safe and secure Also, as a corollary to this argument, more incentive could be given to more plentiful options (in terms of capacity) among different methods of CCS. 18 While the formulation of this model is very simple (only accounting for learning-by-doing as the cause of technological improvement), a further implication of the model is that such differentiated incentives could be a form of different tax levels based on technology types.
The above argument in fact would require careful examination since governments tend to make serious mistakes in "picking the winners" i.e., to find out and nurture most successful technologies for the future. Indeed, industrial policy only made partial success at best even in the interventionist economic model of high-performance East Asian economies (e.g., [24] ). In 18 One of the promising proposals of such alternative CCS approaches is the one with the injection of CO 2 under deep-sea sediments below 3,000m. Though this approach has not been verified yet in actual demonstration, it has a couple of potential advantages: due to high pressures and low temperatures in deep sea, injected CO 2 is liquefied and gravitationally stable, and the storage capacity is virtually limitless. See [7] .
the context of the current model, however, the contrast of CCS and alternative energy is rather clear-cut as these differ in the sign of shadow price trends in the long run. In fact, this shadow price differential could partly explain the uneasiness about CCS (relative to other alternative energies) that some critics express: 19 the differentiated incentive between CCS and alternative energy would clarify and ease the current skepticism about CCS.
